Kosovo's Future Status and U.S. Policy by Woehrel, Steven
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RS21721
Updated January 9, 2006
Kosovo’s Future Status and U.S. Policy
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The future status of Kosovo is perhaps the most sensitive and potentially
destabilizing political question in the Balkans. The Administration views “getting
Kosovo right” as key to integrating the Balkans into Euro-Atlantic institutions.  This
report discusses the issue of Kosovo’s future status; that is, whether it should become
an independent country, or have some form of autonomy within Serbia. Talks on
Kosovo’s status could begin in January 2006, and are expected to be concluded by the
end of the year.  The second session of the 109th Congress may consider legislation on
Kosovo’s status.  This report will be updated as events warrant.  For more on the current
situation in Kosovo, see CRS Report RL31053, Kosovo and U.S. Policy, by Steven J.
Woehrel and Julie Kim.
Background
The current status of Kosovo is governed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244,
passed in June 1999 at the end of the Kosovo conflict.  The resolution authorizes an
international military and civilian presence in Kosovo, the duration of which is at the
discretion of the Security Council.  The NATO-led peacekeeping force KFOR is charged
with maintaining a secure environment, while the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is
given the chief role in administering Kosovo on a provisional basis. The resolution
provides for an interim period of autonomy for Kosovo of undefined length, until
negotiations on the future status of the province take place.  UNMIK is tasked with
gradually transferring its administrative responsibilities to elected, interim autonomous
government institutions, while retaining an oversight role. 
In a future stage, UNMIK will oversee the transfer of authority from the interim
autonomous institutions to permanent ones, after Kosovo’s future status is determined.
UNSC Resolution 1244 provides little insight into how the status issue should be
resolved, saying only that it should be determined by an unspecified “political process.”
However, the resolution explicitly confirms the territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and neighboring Montenegro) and calls for
“substantial autonomy” for Kosovo “within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”  The
FRY was dissolved in February 2003, replaced with a looser “state union” entitled “Serbia
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and Montenegro.” Kosovars believe that the dissolution of the FRY invalidates this
portion of UNSC Resolution 1244, while the international community views Kosovo as
part of Serbia.
“Standards Before Status”
In 2002, UNMIK chief Michael Steiner outlined a series of standards of international
expectations for Kosovo’s institutions and society, and said that they should be achieved
before the issue of Kosovo’s future status is discussed.  This policy has been dubbed
“standards before status,” and it formed the basis of U.S. and international policy in
Kosovo for over three years.  The standards are (1) the existence of effective,
representative and functioning democratic institutions; (2) enforcement of the rule of law;
(3) freedom of movement; (4) sustainable returns of refugees and displaced persons, and
respect for the rights of communities; (5) creation of a sound basis for a market economy;
(6) fair enforcement of property rights; (7) normalized dialogue with Belgrade; and (8)
transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) in line with its mandate. 
The international community’s nearly five years of efforts to bring stability to
Kosovo suffered a serious blow in March 2004.  The death of two ethnic Albanian boys
near the divided city of Mitrovica sparked two days of rioting throughout Kosovo on
March 17-18, in the worst inter-ethnic violence since the end of the 1999 Kosovo war.
Ethnic Albanian crowds attacked several ethnic Serb enclaves as well as international
security forces trying to control the rioters.  In the course of two days, 19 civilians were
killed, more than 900 persons were injured, and over 4,000 forced from their homes by
the violence.   The riots called into question the performance of UNMIK and KFOR, as
well as Kosovo’s government institutions and media.   The international community
decided to streamline the standards process to focus on “priority” standards,  mainly those
involving the respect of minority rights.  According to some U.N. officials and
independent observers, one key purpose of streamlining the standards was to accelerate
consideration of Kosovo’s status and the eventual departure of UNMIK from Kosovo. 
“Year of Decision” for Kosovo’s Status?
In testimony before the House International Relations Committee on May 18, 2005,
Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns laid out a new U.S. policy initiative on Kosovo,
in coordination with the U.N. and the Contact Group.1 He declared that 2005 was the
“year of decision” for Kosovo, meaning that the United States wanted a process to
determine Kosovo’s future status to be launched.  Burns said that the United States hopes
that a U.N. Security Council resolution to endorse the outcome of the status talks will be
approved before the end of 2006.  He said that uncertainty over status is “not sustainable
or desirable” because it “satisfies no one and leaves open the possibility of renewed ethnic
violence,” threatening to undo U.S. successes in the Balkans over the past decade. Burns
added that an international civilian and military presence would continue after a status
settlement in order to ensure its full implementation, including provisions on minority
rights.  He said that the United States would like the European Union to lead this effort,
although the United States would remain “an active partner.” 
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U.N. envoy Kai Eide submitted a report to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in
October 2005 on whether Kosovo had made “sufficient progress” in implementing the
standards for status talks to begin.2 According to both Serbian and ethnic Albanian
officials, the Eide report provides a relatively accurate and balanced assessment of the
situation in Kosovo.  The report praises Kosovo’s achievements in setting up political and
economic institutions.  On the other hand, he noted that the economic situation in the
province is “bleak;” that Kosovo’s police and judicial system suffer from serious
weaknesses; and that the prospects for a multi-ethnic society are  “grim.”  Nevertheless,
Eide recommended that status talks should begin, noting growing impatience with the
status quo within the ethnic Albanian community and “Kosovo fatigue” within the
international community.
In November  2005, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed  Martti Ahtisaari
of Finland to lead the status talks.  In December 2005, the Administration announced that
diplomat Frank Wisner will represent the United States at the status negotiations.
Ahtisaari has said that he hopes talks will begin in January 2006. 
Possible Outcomes 
It is too early to say what Kosovo’s future status will be.  The United States and the
Contact Group have ruled out a return of Kosovo to full Serbian control, such as existed
before the NATO bombing of Kosovo in 1999.  They have also ruled out any changes in
Kosovo’s boundaries and any partition of Kosovo.  Other principles for a settlement
include “full respect of human rights, the right of refugees and displaced persons to return
to their homes, the protection of cultural and religious heritage and the promotion of
effective means to fight organized crime and terrorism.”  The United States and the other
Contact Group countries “agreed to exclude those who advocate violence and that, once
begun, the status process must continue without interruption.”  The settlement must also
“ promote stability not only in Kosovo, but throughout Southeast Europe;” “provide full
democratic rights for all people, especially minorities;” and “further the integration of the
region with the Euro-Atlantic mainstream.”
The main outcomes for the status talks, according to U.S. officials, is whether
Kosovo should be independent, or will it continue under Serbian rule with a greater
measure of autonomy.3 Kosovar leaders have said that they view their region’s
independence as non-negotiable.   They say independence for Kosovo would respond to
the political preferences of the overwhelming majority of the province’s inhabitants and
all of the ethnic Albanian parties in Kosovo’s parliament.  They insist that the only issues
to be discussed are the terms under which the international community will recognize that
independence. 
However, some international observers fear that an independent Kosovo could
destabilize the region by encouraging separatist ethnic Albanian forces in Macedonia, as
well as Serbia’s Presevo Valley, where many ethnic Albanians live. Some also fear
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international support for Kosovar independence could undermine the democratic
leadership in Belgrade and strengthen extreme nationalists there.  There are also questions
about  the ability of the Kosovars to effectively run their own affairs in the near future or
implement any commitments on minority rights, due to the country’s poverty and the
immaturity of ethnic Albanian political and social institutions.  An effective Kosovo
government is particularly important for the issue of dealing with powerful organized
crime groups and political extremists in the province. 
The Serbian government position is that Kosovo must never become independent.
This view is backed by an all-party consensus in the Serbian parliament.  Serbian leaders
have encapsulated their current position on status with the phrase “more than autonomy,
but less than independence.”  However, the terms of the autonomy offered by Serbia are
likely to be unacceptable to the Kosovar Albanian side.  Sanda Raskovic-Ivic, the Serbian
government official in charge of Kosovo affairs, has said that Serbian police would
control Kosovo’s borders and that fiscal and customs policy in Kosovo would be
“connected to” the central government. There would be “one defense minister, one
foreign minister, one seat in the United Nations.” Kosovo would be demilitarized, with
“paramilitary troops” (presumably including ethnic Albanian ones) prohibited.4  
Serbia has also put forward a decentralization plan for Kosovo. The plan would set
up autonomous Serb regions in northern Kosovo and other Serbian-majority enclaves.
Serbian-majority areas in Kosovo would be controlled by local Serb authorities, with their
own police, and would be linked with each other and with Serbia. Ethnic Albanian
authorities would control the rest of the province. Such a plan would have the benefit,
from Belgrade’s point of view, of consolidating its control over northern Kosovo, where
most Serbs in the province now live, and where important economic assets, such as the
Trepca mining complex, are found. Ethnic Albanian leaders strongly oppose the idea for
these very reasons. To a certain extent, the  Serbian plan seeks to strengthen and ratify the
existing situation, particularly  in northern Kosovo.  Since 1999, international officials
and ethnic Albanians have criticized Serbia for supporting “parallel structures” that
cement its control over Serb-majority areas at the expense of UNMIK’s authority. 
Some observers have speculated that Serbia’s hard-line stance may be a negotiating
tactic, with a possible fall-back position that would try to secure a partition of Kosovo,
with northern Kosovo formally becoming part of Serbia and the rest becoming
independent.  However, the United States and other members of the Contact Group have
ruled out a partition of Kosovo.  Serbian leaders may also seek or be offered other forms
of compensation, such as easier terms for NATO and EU membership, or at least
increased aid from these institutions and their member countries.  Serbian experts realize
that such concessions, even if offered by the international community, may lack
credibility due to “enlargement fatigue” in many European countries, among other
factors.5  Moreover, Serbian experts warn that the current political situation in Serbia may
make any public concessions on its part difficult.  The Serbian government holds a narrow
and unstable majority in parliament, and new elections are possible, even likely, in 2006.
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If there is a backlash against a Kosovo settlement, the ultranationalist Radical Party is
expected to benefit, perhaps even take power. 
“Conditional Independence” for Kosovo?
Although U.S. and European officials have been careful to state publicly that they
favor no particular outcome to the talks, press reports have quoted independent experts
and unnamed diplomats as suggesting that Kosovo could receive “conditional
independence.”6  Independence would be granted in exchange for pledges from Kosovo
to rule out merger with Albania and other ethnic Albanian-inhabited regions of Serbia,
Macedonia, and Montenegro in a “greater Albania.”  Kosovo would also have to provide
guarantees to respect the rights of ethnic minorities in Kosovo and agree to continued
international oversight in this and possibly other areas.  If the international community
does settle on conditional independence as their preferred solution, much of the
negotiation with the Kosovo government may revolve around the conditions and timetable
for international recognition, the oversight powers of an international successor mission
to UNMIK, and the extent of decentralization and the borders of municipalities. 
The Eide report, which does not endorse a status option, suggests that a future
international mission, led by the European Union, could be modeled on the international
High Representative in Bosnia.  The High Representative does not directly administer
Bosnia but has powers to veto legislation and remove obstructionist leaders.  In addition,
Eide proposed that international police and judges continue to participate in Kosovo’s
fragile legal system.  Eide also called for a “wider decentralization” for Kosovo and
“horizontal links” between Serbian municipalities without endangering Kosovo’s central
institutions.  On October 24, 2005, Kosovo Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi warned
against “any conditions or new interim phases” to Kosovo’s independence.  He said that
he expected that an international “observation or advisory” mission in Kosovo could serve
as “a psychological and practical guarantee for ethnic groups that their rights are
observed” but that “Kosovo must be an independent and sovereign state.”7
Is A Negotiated Settlement Possible?
One important question is what to do if the parties to the negotiation cannot reach
agreement, on the basis of conditional independence or another option. U.S. officials say
that the international community would not try to impose a result.  However, given
Belgrade’s flat rejection of any form of independence for Kosovo and the Kosovars’
rejection of any outcome but independence, it may be difficult to reach a consensus.  The
United States and its allies may therefore be faced with an embarrassing deadlock, such
as occurred at the failed Rambouillet negotiations that preceded the NATO bombing
campaign against Serbia in 1999.  In  testimony before the House International Relations
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Committee in May 2005, Undersecretary Burns warned that “undue delay” or obstruction
by Serbia in status talks could cause the United States to “reevaluate Belgrade’s role.”8
If the international community attempted to impose a settlement, it would be faced
with difficult problems.  If the Serbian side rejected a proposed settlement, it could prevail
upon Russia to threaten to veto a Security Council resolution endorsing it. On the other
hand, Russia might be reluctant to isolate itself on the issue, particularly since the
presence of U.S. and European troops and administrators means that the EU and the
United States have more influence on the situation on the ground in Kosovo than Russia
has.  A move by the United States or other countries to endorse a proposed settlement
without the support of Serbia, Russia, other members of the Contact Group, or the
Security Council could provoke recriminations such as those that bedeviled international
policy in the Balkans in the early 1990s. 
 Leverage over the Kosovar side to accept solutions other than independence may
also be limited.  Kosovar leaders know that the international community has little desire
to administer Kosovo indefinitely, particularly given the possibility that the ethnic
Albanian majority in Kosovo could become more hostile to the  international presence if
their demands for independence continue to be rejected.  However, Kosovo’s continued
need for aid and security guarantees may be important levers for the international
community in the talks. 
Congressional Concerns
The issue of Kosovo’s future status has been of significant interest to Members of
Congress. Some Members favor independence for Kosovo as soon as possible. They say
Kosovars should enjoy the same right of self-determination enjoyed by other peoples in
the region and throughout the world.  On the other hand, other Members are more
skeptical about pushing strongly for Kosovo independence in the near future.  They say
that moving too quickly could destabilize the situation in the Balkans. They favor
continuing to press the people of Kosovo to implement the standards.
The 109th Congress has taken up the issue of Kosovo’s status.  On January 4, 2005,
Representative Tom Lantos introduced H.Res. 24, which expresses the sense of the House
that the United States should support Kosovo’s independence.   On October 7, 2005, the
Senate passed S.Res. 237, a resolution supporting efforts to “work toward an agreement
on the future status of Kosovo.”  The resolution said that the unresolved status of Kosovo
is not sustainable.  It did not express support for any particular status option but said that
it should “satisfy the key concerns” of the people of Kosovo and Serbia and Montenegro.
Other resolutions may be introduced in second session of the 109th Congress, in
anticipation or during status negotiations.  An identical House resolution was introduced
on December 17, 2005 (H.Res. 634).  The second session of the 109thCongress may also
consider legislation on Kosovo’s status.
